Chen Lu

Yuegang: Opening the “Zhangzhou Era”

月港:“漳州时代”开启

From the late 15th to the 16th century, as European fleets searched for new routes and partners, Ming China was not entirely absent from this global surge of seaborne trade. In Western records, Zhangzhou—“Chincheo”—stood alongside Ningbo (“Liampo,” referring to Shuangyu) as a key hub of international private maritime commerce.

Yuegang (Moon Harbor), Zhangzhou: a gateway to maritime trade networks in late Ming China
Figure: The Yuegang in Longhai District, Zhangzhou, is in the process of transitioning between old and new urban areas.
Publication Originally published in Sanlian Lifeweek (Issue 12, 2023). Read full article (Link) ↗

Editor’s note

编辑说明

This reported feature follows how Yuegang—an unassuming harbor in today’s Zhangzhou—briefly moved into the center of a global maritime moment. By tracking one coastal node from Wuyu to Moon Harbor, the story reads “sea ban vs. opening” not as an abstract policy debate, but as a chain of lived pressures: smuggling, local compromise, military crackdowns, and the eventual legalization of private trade.

这篇报道从今天看似安静的漳州月港出发,追踪它如何在特定历史窗口进入全球海洋贸易网络的中心。 我把“海禁/开海”从抽象政策争论拉回沿海社会的真实压力链条:走私与妥协如何形成,军事清剿如何发生, 以及合法化的开禁如何在一次次冲突与博弈中被迫到来。

Key questions

核心问题框架

  • How did Zhangzhou (“Chincheo”) become legible in Western records as a private-trade hub during the Age of Sail?
  • What did “sea ban” mean on the ground—when coastal livelihoods depended on leaving shore?
  • How did conflict (Wuyu, Zoumaxi) reshape policy debates, local alliances, and the geography of trade?
  • After legalization in 1567, how did Yuegang grow into a port network tied to Southeast Asia—and to the rise of the Zheng maritime empire?
  • 为何在西方记载中,漳州(Chincheo)会与宁波(Liampo)并列为大航海时代的私人贸易中心?
  • 当沿海生计高度依赖出海时,“海禁”在地方社会具体意味着什么?
  • 浯屿与走马溪之战如何改变冲突格局、地方同盟与贸易地理,并推动政策走向松动?
  • 1567年开禁后,月港如何连接东南亚大商业网络,并与郑氏海上帝国的崛起相互嵌合?

Selected excerpts

文章节选

Excerpt 1: Wuyu, Kinmen—and a forgotten frontline of the Age of Sail

Today, Wuyu is hardly a famous name.

To reach the island, you first arrive at Doumei village in Longhai, Zhangzhou. By the dock, a warm-hearted seafood-shop owner invites us to sit with a fresh cup of Tieguanyin. He checks his watch and explains that boats leave on the hour; it takes fifteen minutes to land. From the pier, you can see the island’s coastline traced by tightly packed houses—Wuyu still holds six to seven thousand residents, most living by fishing. Water and electricity are expensive, he adds, because fresh water has to be transported from the mainland. “On a clear day, you can see Kinmen from here.”

He runs outside to prove it—staring into the distance, pointing to a faint shape behind Wuyu, like a mirage. The geography naturally calls up cross-strait history. But in the time-space of this story, what matters is a different connection: a clash between the Ming state and Portuguese traders. Locals even prefer an older name, “Yiyu,” because the island was once seen as a foreign nest.

如今的浯屿声名不显。

要登上浯屿,得先抵达漳州市龙海区的斗美村。码头边,热心肠的海鲜店老板招呼我们坐下喝杯刚沏好的铁观音,又看了看手表说:去浯屿的船每隔一小时整点出发,15分钟便可以上岛。从斗美码头望去,岛上的房屋鳞次栉比,沿着海岸线勾勒出了浯屿岛的大致轮廓——浯屿岛如今还有着六七千常住人口,大部分仍以渔业为生,但当地水电都很贵,因为淡水需要从陆地上运过去。“天气好的时候,从这里能看到金门。”

他甚至冲出门极目远眺,指给我看浯屿岛背后隐约出现、仿若海市蜃楼般的小岛,“那就是金门”。地理上与金门一衣带水的浯屿很容易让人联想到两岸历史,但在我们要讲述的大航海时代语境里,更重要的是它与一场明朝廷和葡萄牙人之间战役的关联。当地人甚至更习惯以“夷屿”相称,因为历史上这里曾被葡萄牙人据为巢穴。

Excerpt 2: Sea ban, smuggling, and Zhu Wan’s pursuit from Shuangyu to Wuyu

Under the Ming policy that “not a single plank may enter the sea,” private maritime trade still grew—driven by profit and necessity—and the conflict between local life and imperial control was sharpest along the Fujian–Zhejiang coast.

As the Age of Sail reordered oceanic worlds, Portuguese traders—failing to secure legal commerce—turned to smuggling along China’s southeast. In 1548, after a military victory over the smuggling port of Shuangyu, the imperial commander Zhu Wan ordered the main force back to Fujian. The Portuguese, pushed out of Ningbo and unable to return to Malacca due to storms, regrouped on the Fujian coast with Chinese and foreign private merchants, seizing Wuyu as a new base. The battles later known as Wuyu and Zoumaxi were, in effect, continuations of Shuangyu—a pursuit campaign that brought Zhu Wan’s crackdown into direct collision with a coastal trading society.

在“片板不许入海”、实施严格海禁政策的明朝,因利益驱使发展的私人航海贸易兴起并日益壮大,而在当地居民多以航海贸易为生的闽浙沿海地区,这种民间与官方的冲突表现尤为激烈。

与此同时,大航海时代带来的海洋秩序重建也波及明王朝。葡萄牙人谋求合法贸易失败后,开始在东南沿海从事走私。嘉靖二十七年(1548)九月,时任浙闽提督的朱纨在针对双屿港走私贸易取得军事胜利后,催令福建备倭都指挥使卢镗率明军主力回军福建。此时被逐出宁波的葡萄牙人“因风暴不能返回满剌加,于是来到福建沿海……占据浯屿为新巢”。因此,浯屿、走马溪之战都是双屿之战的延续,是朱纨乘胜追击、与葡萄牙人在福建沿海一系列冲突的结果。

Excerpt 3: Blockade, collapse—and the battle at Zoumaxi

By late 1548, the Ming commander Lu Tang attempted to cut Wuyu off from the outside world—intercepting supply boats and tightening a maritime blockade.

Direct assault was difficult. The Portuguese refused to meet the Ming fleet at sea, leaving the attack ineffective; blockade became the only option. After three months, in early 1549, short of provisions, the Portuguese and their allies abandoned Wuyu. Some rode the northeast monsoon back to Malacca, but others stayed in Fujian waters, unwilling to leave without collecting payments. In February, a group returned toward Zhangzhou and anchored near Zoumaxi. They were discovered. On February 20, armed conflict erupted; the Portuguese were nearly annihilated. In the adventurer Pinto’s recollection, the encounter was catastrophic—ships seized, hundreds killed. Forced away from the Fujian coast, the Portuguese drifted back toward Guangdong. Only later would Macau emerge as their foothold, and a new East Asian trade system take shape.

嘉靖二十七年(1548)十月二十六日,福建备倭都指挥使卢镗率兵船出海,试图断绝浯屿与外界联系,不断截击前往接济的船只。

由于对浯屿展开正面攻击非常难,葡萄牙人坚持不出海应战,令明军攻击难以奏效,卢镗只能加强封锁。嘉靖二十八年(1549)正月,被困浯屿长达三个月之久的葡萄牙人与其同伙因缺少粮食等物资供应,不得不放弃浯屿。部分人乘东北季风回满剌加,另一些人因尚未收回商款,不愿离开闽海。二月十一日,他们返回漳州,在诏安县走马溪附近灵宫澳下湾抛泊,很快被卢镗、柯乔发现。二月二十日双方发生武装冲突,葡萄牙人几乎全军覆没。平托在回忆里也记下了这场“走马溪(Chabaquea)”的惨败。此后葡萄牙人不得已离开福建沿海,再次回到广东沿海,后来才有占据澳门并建立新东亚贸易体系的发生。

Excerpt 4: Victory, impeachment, and the political cost of enforcing the ban

Zhu Wan appeared to have won. But his hardline enforcement cut directly against the interests of coastal elites and residents whose lives were tied to the sea—triggering backlash across the social ladder.

He was impeached, especially by officials from Fujian and Zhejiang. One key charge was that he executed captives first and reported later: Portuguese prisoners as well as ninety-six Chinese men led by a merchant figure known as Li Guangtou. The censors argued that those killed were not necessarily “foreign pirates,” and that bearing Chinese names did not prove rebellion. Zhu Wan, Lu Tang, and others were prosecuted; Zhu Wan ultimately took poison in prison. The history entered the official record with a grim clarity: “Even if the Son of Heaven does not wish me dead, the men of Fujian and Zhejiang will kill me… I will decide my own death.”

尽管朱纨看似取得了极大的胜利,但他严厉的海禁举措却侵犯了闽浙沿海乡官大贾以及沿海地区居民的利益,引起了社会各阶层的不满。

也正因如此,他遭到了朝中众多官僚、尤其是闽浙籍官员的弹劾。因为朱纨先斩后奏,杀了被俘的葡萄牙人以及以海商头目李光头为首的96名中国人。御史陈九德等人弹劾其擅自滥杀无辜、谎报战功,并指出被杀“九十六人者未必尽皆夷寇也,同中国姓名者,非沿海居民乎?又恐未必尽皆谋叛者也”。最终朱纨与卢镗、柯乔等人一同被治罪,朱纨在狱中服毒自尽。《明史》记载他得知获罪时感慨:“纵天子不欲死我,闽、浙人必杀我。吾死,自决之,不须人也。”

Excerpt 5: Legal opening at Yuegang—and a port that fed the Zheng maritime empire

In 1567, Yuegang was formally opened as a legal port for private overseas trade—allowing merchants to sail to the “Eastern and Western Oceans,” while forbidding voyages to Japan.

The “Longqing opening” was a major turn after two centuries of restriction. On the ground, it was also pragmatic: local officials believed bans could not be enforced and that legalization at least allowed taxation. Yet the state’s grasp remained partial. As historian Wang Rigen notes, Fujian’s jagged coastline offered countless small harbors; coastal defense was point-based, leaving gaps; officials were easily corrupted; and merchants played hide-and-seek—shifting ports whenever policy tightened. Yuegang became the only officially recognized private-trade port, but that did not mean comprehensive control over private maritime commerce.

In late Ming, Yuegang linked to more than forty Southeast Asian polities, and its traffic surged. From this loosened environment, the Zheng group rose. Zheng Zhilong—“Zheng Yi”—absorbed commercial power from predecessors, expanded fleets, levied “taxes” on foreign ships, and effectively shared dominance of the seas with the Dutch East India Company. A hand-painted nautical chart later known as the Selden Map—rediscovered in Oxford centuries later—mapped routes from Quanzhou across the Eastern and Western Oceans. Scholars link its network to the very maritime empire Zheng Zhilong controlled. Standing at Zhenhaijiao, facing the Taiwan Strait, the story folds back into a larger loop: from Cape Roca, where Portugal’s voyages began, to Zhangzhou, where those voyages finally arrived.

隆庆元年(1567),在巡抚徐泽民的建议下,月港正式开放为民间海外贸易的港口,允许民间商人往来东西二洋,但仍然严禁商人出航日本。

隆庆开海是明初以来200年海禁政策的重大转折,也是一种被动妥协:地方官员认为限制达不到目的,不如合法化以便征税。但这并不意味着官方就能全面掌控私人海洋贸易。王日根教授指出,福建海岸线曲折,可用港口众多;官方海防多为“点状”设置,点与点之间留下空档;地方官员又易被腐蚀。民间商人像捉迷藏一样,政策一收缩就转往别的港口。月港虽是唯一被官方承认的私人贸易港口,却不代表官方对整体形势有全面控制。

到了明后期,月港商船云集,抵达东南亚四十多个国家和地区。在逐渐松动的贸易环境中,郑氏集团登上舞台。郑芝龙继承并扩张海上商业帝国,掌控台湾海峡制海权,并向外国货船征收税银,与荷兰东印度公司瓜分海上秩序。牛津大学鲍德林图书馆藏的《雪尔登中国地图》(后被称作《明代东西洋航海图》)绘出泉州通往东西洋的航路体系,学界常将其与郑芝龙所控制的航线网络相互印证。站在镇海角,背靠台湾海峡,海浪拍崖之际,我也想起多年前在葡萄牙罗卡角的经历:从那片欧亚大陆的西南端出发的远航,最终抵达了漳州,让这座中国边陲小城进入世界海洋贸易网络中心。

What this demonstrates

它能证明什么

  • Field-driven maritime history: combining site visits (ports, islands, forts) with archival voices to make sea routes and policy conflicts readable.
  • 以现场为线索的海洋史写作:把港口、岛屿与海防遗迹的走访,与史料叙述并置,让航路与政策冲突变得“可读”。
  • Policy as lived pressure: translating “sea ban / opening” into concrete interests—coastal livelihoods, local compromise, military crackdowns, and political backlash.
  • 把政策写成“生活压力”:将海禁/开海落到具体利益结构——沿海生计、地方妥协、军事清剿与政治反噬。
  • Network-scale storytelling: tracing how a single port node connects to Southeast Asian commerce and to the rise of the Zheng maritime empire.
  • 以网络尺度讲故事:从一个港口节点出发,追踪它如何连向东南亚商业网络,并与郑氏海上帝国的崛起互相嵌合。